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NIETZSCHE, DEMOCRACY, AND EXCELLENCE:
POLITICS AS JAZZ
LAWRENCE J. HATAB
In this paper I would like to advance further, with the help of a mus-
ical analogy, some of the themes of my recent book, A Nietzschean De-
/ense 0/ Democracy. I In that work I attempt a deconstruction of Nie-
tzsche's critique of democracy by redescribing democratic politics in
Nietzschean terms. Nietzsche's main objections to democracy stern from
his presumption that de~ocracyrepresents the ascendancy of egalitarian
mediocrity, normalizing conformity, and a generalized model of rational
agency-all of which are taken to subvert the development of cultural
excellence, particularly those rare creators who are essential to the
furtherance of life. Accordingly, Nietzsche appears to advocate an aristo-
cratic, authoritarian political order on behalf of fostering and ordaining
the excellent few,whose value-creation can animate a kind of trickle-
down cultural economy reminiscent of Plato's political hierarchy (A 57).
My deconstruction of Nietzsche depends in part on refusing an overly
broad conception of "the political" and sustaining a distinction between
cultural and political production. In matters of cultural production per-
taining to creativity and normalcy, excellence and mediocrity, I take
Nietzsche's diagnosis of egalitarianism to be insightful and defensible. In
matters of political production, however, pertaining to the formation and
structure of political institutions, the concrete problems and practices of
politicallife, the legitimacy of coercion, and the extent of sovereignty, I
take Nietzsche's anti-democratic posture to be an impoverished and naive
political program. At the same time, I do not want to let Nietzsche off the
hook by separating the cultural and political spheres, as some have done.
I argue, first of all, that the kind of nonfoundational openness marking
Nietzsche's cultural and philosophical reflections (particularly agonistics,
perspectivism, and suspicion) would seem to undermine the kind of clos-
ure intrinsic to his authoritarian politics. Secondly, I argue that there is
significant overlap between Nietzschean predilections and life in a demo-
cratic society, especially the extent to which certain nonegalitarian ar-
rangements can and do operate in democratic politics.
My contention is that democracy, in both a cultural and political
sense, is more amenable to Nietzsche's interests than he imagined, that
democracy dictates neither the hegemony of a normalizing order nor the
egalitarian denial of excellence or social stratification. Rather than de-
pend on notions of substantive equality or rationalized constraint,
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democracy can be construed in another register as a fundamental open-
ness with regard to meanings, purposes, and performances in both polit-
ical and cultural spheres. Democracy can be called an open-ended ex-
periment that generates both the creation and interrogation of social
goods, rather than a politics derived from fixed assumpti,ons about the
nature, origins or locations of social goods. I should address, however, an
apparent misunderstanding of my work on the part of some readers. I do
not argue that democratic politics necessarily elicits distinguished results
(it can, for instance, impeach a President over adefinition of sex), but
simply that mediocrity is not essential to democracy, and that aristocratic
alternatives cannot hold up under the weight of Nietzsche's thought.
It is important to stress a particular contribution Nietzsche can make
to a reconsideration of democracy. There are many philosophies of differ-
ence in a postmodern vein that can and have come to speak on behalf of
democratic openness, some even in Nietzsche's name. But few writers
have embraced Nietzsche's affirmation of excellence. There is difference
and then there is difference. Excellence is a form of difference that im-
plies gradation and judgments concerning superior and inferior, better
and worse performances. Many have embraced a Nietzschean openness to
difference on behalf of a generalized liberation of diverse life styles and
modes of self-creation. Such a generalized emancipation, however, was
not Nietzsche's vision. He was interested in fostering special individuals
and achievements. I question whether certain postmodern celebrations of
difference conceal a kind of egalitarianism in their avoidance or suppres-
sion of Nietzsche's clear comfort with social stratification. It is important,
in my view, to sustain a sense of excellence that is vital for both demo-
cratic politics and cultural production.2 Excellence and democracy are
compatible as long as excellence is understood in a contextual and per-
formative sense, rather than a substantive sense of permanent, pervasive,
or essential superiority.
The main issues in my discussion here revolve around the following
three dyads: structure and openness, socialization and individuation,
normalcy and innovation. It is important to note that Nietzsche affirms
hoth terms in each dyad, but he stresses the latter term in each on behalf
of culture-creation, and he thinks that democracy represents the rule of
the former term in each dyad at the expense of the latter term. It is this
Nietzschean complaint that I question. Democracy can accommodate
hoth terms in each dyad and thus admit a kind of excellence of perform-
ance that is not restricted to or by common, ordinary domains. First of all,
I think it is simply untrue that democratic societies engender a decline
or eclipse of artistic creativity or high-level intellectual work. Mass mar-
kets and sensihilities are indeed evident and effectual in democratic
cultures, but they are not exhaustive. Moreover, many so-called popular
cultural works can hold their own compared to so-called serious works,
as I will argue shortly with respect to the musical form of jazz. In general
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terms, 1 wonder if the actual ratio of quality work to mediocre achieve-
ment ever has changed or ever will change to any appreciable degree,
irrespective of different historical eras, political formats, or social struc-
tures. One advantage of a democratic society is that it does not presume
vested origins of excellence, and indeed it might harvest more excellence
by casting out a wider net than more restrictive societies have done. Sec-
ondly, 1think that democratic political practice has always exhibited cer-
tain elitist tendencies in executive, legislative, and judicial spheres of
government. More on this shortly.
It must be emphasized that Nietzsche recognizes the importance of
both the rule and the exception, both socialization and individuation in
culturallife. Nietzsche also does not advocate a generalized ideal of indi-
vidual freedom. First of all, he calls the philosophical notion of an atomic
individual an error (TI "Skirmishes" 33; BGE 12), and claims that most
of what we understand as human nature is a factor of socialized, comnlU-
nicative structures (GS 117, 354). Individuated freedom, for Nietzsche, is
restricted to select divergences from the norm that prompt cultural inno-
vations. Freedom, therefore, is not for everyone but for the excellent few
who generate creative work (GS 76; Z:l "On the Way of the Creator";
BGE 29). The exception and the rule are both essential for human cul-
ture: the exception furthers the species, while the rule preserves the
species (GS 55). Even creative freedom, for Nietzsche, is not an abandon-
ment of structure and constraint. Creativity disrupts existing structures in
order to bring forth new structures. Nietzsche calls innovation a kind of
"dancing in chains" (WS 140). Since creativity is a shaping process, it
requires long periods of preparatory obedience (BGE 188). For Nietzsche,
certain "fetters" are needed both to prepare cultural departures from
purely natural states (HH 221) and to give a discernible shape to new
cultural forms (WS 140). Creative excellence, then, is a complex intersec-
tion of freedom and form, divergence and constraint, openness and
structure.
Since normalcy, constraint, and structure are not rejected by Nie-
tzsche, his objections to democracy cannot stern from the existence of
such forces per se in democratic societies, but from the presumed sover-
eignty of such forces that suppresses creative excellence. 1 want to focus
my interrogation of Nietzsche on this point by considering the phenome-
non of jazz, which 1 suggest can stand as a model of "democratic excel-
lence" in a number of ways.
Jazz is a distinctive and exceptional musical form that emerged not
only in a democratic culture, but from a significantly disadvantaged
segment of American society that was decidedly less than equal in social
status. Jazz is an art form that represents, 1 think, amortal blow to the
elitist binary of "high" culture and "popular" culture that for so long has
animated Western intellectual circles, Nietzsche included. From a formal
standpoint, it can be said that jazz is a perfect instantiation of the dyadic
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intersections of structure and openness mentioned earlier in the context
of Nietzsche's philosophy. Not only can jazz exemplify a Nietzschean
model of creative excellence, it can also be taken as an effective metaphor
for democratic political practice, in such a way as to disrupt Nietzsche's
assumptions about democracy, and to significantly modify standard
assumptions in traditional democratic theory as weIl. In short, I want to
frame my discussion of jazz on two distinct levels: 1) jazz as a "demo-
cratic" art form that exhibits certain Nietzschean elements, and 2) jazz as
a metaphor for certain nonegalitarian and nonformulaic elements in
democratic politicallife, particularly with respect to politicalleadership,
legislation, and judicial practice.
Jazz is a musical form that is directly animated by the confluence of
structure and openness, socialization and individuation, normalcy and
innovation-with a clear (Nietzschean) tilt toward the latter element in
each dyade A distinctive feature of jazz is the pride of place given to im-
provisation. The word improvisation comes from Latin and Italian roots
meaning something sudden or unforeseen. Jazz performance begins with
establishing a melodic theme, tonal structure, and rhythmic pattern,
followed by individual soloists improvising spontaneous musical adven-
tures amidst the background of the basic order of the piece sustained by
the rest of the ensemble.3 The openness of improvisation therefore is
launched by, and never completely exceeds, the background musical
structure.4 At the same time, ensemble backup playing in jazz is not
completely constrained or passive. The soloist and the other musicians
can playoff each other and spur mutual experiments in the performance.
The complex dynamic of theme and improvisation, collectivity and indi-
viduation, show that an essential element of jazz performance is a fluid
reciprocity. The openness of improvised freedom is not a sheer departure
from musical form of the collective effort. That is why sheer egoism or
self-regard is considered a dispositional vice in jazz. Part of the discipline
of jazz is learning how to integrate creative invention with the overall
effect of the musical ensemble. Jazz playing cannot be construed along
the lines of individual agency alone.
Another way to understand the role of order and .constraint in jazz is
to consider the formal structure of musical training. Jazz entails rigorous
instruction and practice to gain proficiency in musical patterns and
instrumental techniques. Most jazz players are serious students of music.
The freedom of jazz performance cannot be dissociated from an organ-
ized cultivation of musical habits and skills.
With regard to openness, in addition to the role of improvisation,
there are a number of ways in which jazz exceeds the more rigid con-
structions of order in the Western tradition and classical musical forms.
Unlike the static plastic arts, jazz, like all music, is a temporally struc-
tured movement and performance that is essentially a mode of becoming.
And unlike the temporal structure of literary texts, jazz allows for a poly-
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phonic concurrence of different voices and rhythms running simulta-
neously in a single performance.
The temporal structure of jazz can be distinguished from most West-
ern classical forms in its Mrican-inspired rhythms and syncopations,
which have a freewheeling quality compared to more regular, symmetri-
cal cadences. African influences also gave jazz a more visceral, corporeal,
and sensual register. Jazz excites the limbs and the loins as weIl as the
ears, as contrasted with more staid structures and effects in much of
Western music. This is why jazz has often been perceived as startling and
threatening in many circles, and not without reason-the movements of
jazz have always prompted a certain carnal excitement. The word "jazz"
in fact was a slang term associated with enthusiasm and sexual inter-
course.
Finally, syncopation in jazz is "better captured by the term "swing."
Swing is syncopation smoothed out with a certain give, a limber lilt and
sway that cannot be rendered in any formal indication. Syncopation can
be indicated in musical notation, but swing cannot. As they say, you either
got it or you don't. Put it this way: The Lawrence Welk Orchestra can
play syncopation, but they cannot swing. Inappropriate performances of
jazz and related popular music have long been an embarrassment. Think
of white performances of black music in the 50s and 60s, aptly called
"covering" (I still cringe when 1hear Pat Boone covering Little Richard).
Or even worse, think of classically trained opera singers trying to perform
jazz tunes or popular ballads. If there is a hell, surely one of its circles is
called "Pavarotti Sings Gershwin."
From the preceding discussion, it is not hard to construe jazz-in its
temporality, structured openness, passional corporeality, and stylistic
finesse-as a decidedly Nietzschean art from. Indeed, jazz seems to be a
perfect embodiment of the Apollonian-Dionysian dyad that Nietzsche
insisted was the mark of a healthy culture, with its blend of moderated
form and passionate excess. It could be said that jazz interjected a Dio-
nysian element into Apollonian predispositions of Western music. 1think
Nietzsche would have liked jazz, but I'm not sure. Frankly, 1 have a hard
time picturing Friedrich Nietzsche at a jazz club, in a groove, so to speak.
Be that as it may, jazz is an art form that exhibits many Nietzschean
features, and at least it stands as one counterexample to the charge that
a democratic society cannot generate creative excellence.
Next I w~nt to explore the possibilities of jazz as a (Nietzschean)
metaphor for political practice in a democratic society. Before 1 begin, 1
must address a prejudice that stands in the way. Many readers of Nie-
tzsche downplay or disregard political ramifications of his thought,
maintaining that Nietzsche is primarily interested in self-creation and is
even contemptuous of political institutions and structures. But consider
the Apollonian-Dionysian dyad, which is usually interpreted as an aes-
thetic dynamic permeated by ecstatic excess. In The Birth ofTragedy 21,
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the Apollonian indeed is associated with the political order, while the
Dionysian is associated with the counter-political energy of dissolution.
We must remember, however, that Nietzsehe does not advocate a purely
Dionysian conception of tragedy or culture. The Apollonian allows for the
shaping of culture and meaning. As Nietzsehe says, a pure Dionysian force
would prompt "orgiastic self-annihilation." Tragedy is the "fraternal
union" of Apollo and Dionysus, as "a whole without denial of individual
existence." In fact, Nietzsehe specifically reads tragedy here from a polit-
ical standpoint as a "mixture," a "mediator" between "ecstatic brooding"
and "worldly power." This overtly political section of The Birth 0/
Tragedy closes with the proclamation that in tragedy, Apollo and Diony-
sus "speak each other's language," which can be read, then, as both an
affirmation of politics and a notification of the ineluctable finitude of
politics.
For those who think that pressing Nietzsehe into such political terri-
tory would be a distortion of a thinker who championed the transgression
of social boundaries and who diagnosed modern institutions as progeny
of slave morality, I would recall Nietzsche's affirmation of the norm cited
earlier, and I would also point to a fascinating passage regarding law and
justice in On the Genealogy 0/Morals (11:11) that, as far as I know, has
not received much attention. There Nietzsehe claims that although the
larger economy of nature is "unjust," nevertheless the historical force of
human law creates social conceptions of justice and injustice. What is
surprising is that Nietzsehe does not diagnose such forces as sheer in-
firmities. Legal arrangements are called "exceptional conditions" (aus-
nahme-Zustände) that modify natural will to power in social directions
and that represent not an erasure of conflict, hut an instrument in the
ongoing conflict of various power complexes-something akin, I would
suggest, to the notion of separation of powers or an adversarial legal
system.s More pointedly, the historical development of law is attrihuted
not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that in fact check
and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," that even reconstitute of-
fenses as more "impersonal" violations of law rather than sheer personal
injury. Here we find Nietzsehe analyzing a legal system as a life-promot-
ing cultural force that simply refashions natural energies in less savage
and nlore productive directions. This passage surely undermines many
interpretations of Nietzsehe as an antl-institutional transgressor. We
should also take note of a passage from Twilight 0/ the Idols ("Skir-
mishes" 39) that diagnoses a repudiation of institutions and authority as
a form of decadence.
With these notices of political elements in Nietzsche's thought, let
me now explore the possibilities of democratic politics as a kind of jazz
along Nietzschean lines. I want to suggest democracy as a polyphonie
collective gathering for political decision-making that, like jazz, in many
respects is improvisational and selective: improvisational in the sense of
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a confluence of structure and openness that marks most political prac-
tices; selective in the sense of certain stand-out performances that lead or
advance political undertakings to a degree disproportionate to the role
and influence of other citizens in the body politic.
An improvisational model of politics steers amiddIe course between
anarchical and foundationalist political theories, and it is particularly
suited to the democratic notion of ongoing interrogation of both political
decisions and statutory provisions, and also to the dialogical reciprocity
of political exchanges in democratic discourse. For all the citations of
metaphysical principles in the history of democratic movements (e.g.,
natural rights, substantive equality), the actuallife-blood of democratic
practice has been its structured openness, which I would call experimen-
tal improvisations on provisional themes rather than strict axiomatic
applications of principles. We should note that Nietzsche associates
democracy in a general way with improvisation and experiments. In The
Gay Science 356, he directly identifies democratic movements with a
sense of improvisation that challenges other eras where human nature
and its possibilities were fixed and constrained by traditional patterns. In
The Wanderer and His Shadow 292, he says that democracy "thirsts for
innovations and is greedy for experiments." Surely we notice a connec-
tion here with Nietzsche's own advocacy of an experimental disposition
in philosophy (see GS 51, 319; BGE 42).
To help flesh out the model of politics suggested here, we should
explore further the meaning of improvisation.6 We can distinguish be-
tween weak, moderate, and strong senses of improvisation: 1) weak im-
provisation in the sense of fixed performances of a set piece with stylistic
variations in each case, as in different interpretations of compositions in
classical music; 2) moderate improvisation in the sense of spontaneous
invention within a structured setting, as in the case of jazz; 3) strong im-
provisation in the sense of spontaneou~invention of a setting per se, as in
the case of improvisational comedy. It should be said that these three
senses of improvisation can overlap in a number of ways and cases, and
all three alike are distinguishable from sheer duplication or axiomatic
application. Moreover, even strong improvisation is not sheer inventive-
ness, since it depends on various background settings, expectations,
habits, and so forth. Strong improvisation in many ways reflects everyday
sociallife, where we spontaneously construct our dealings and projects in
an informal network of promptings, possibilities, problems, and solutions.
Moderate improvisation fits weIl many of the more formalized arrange-
ments of political practice, but as structured openness, politicallife has
many elements of both weak and strong modes of improvisation. I should
add that the kind of educational training that fosters effective political
participation provides a kind of background cultivation of proficiency
that is analogous to the role of musical training mentioned in the context
of jazz.
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Political performance in democracy is improvisational in all three
senses, considering such activities as electoral campaigns, legislation, ad-
judication, judicial review, constitutional amendment, executive leader-
ship, representative government, and general citizen participation. Dif-
ferent activities can reflect different degrees and combinations of strong,
moderate, and weak improvisation. For instance, electoral campaigns and
citizen participation are more in the strong mode, legislation and amend-
ment more in the strong to moderate mode, a court trial more in the weak
mode, judicial review more in the weak to moderate mode, political
leadership more in the moderate to strong mode. All such activities, then,
as instances of politicallife and practice, possess some degree of improvi-
sation, construed as modes of structured openness rather than fully
grounded replications or exemplifications.
One way to understand many standard political theories is their dis-
comfort with the improvisational nature of politics, and their preference
for a compositional model, wherein guidance for political practice is
securely established in some Urtext or set of principles (e.g., constitu-
tional provisions, Hobbesian axioms, Kantian maxims, utilitarian calcula-
tions) that can regulate political decisions in a manner analogous to sci-
entific techniques of rationality. Political theorists of such stripes usually
regret or even resent political practice, in much the same way that a
musical composer might complain in the wings that performers are taking
too many liberties with the score. A more pragmatic approach to politics,
on the other hand, would he comfortahle with at least comparahle status
given to composition and performance, and perhaps even a kind of
political jazz, where a composition launches performances and yet yields
in favor of experimental variations. Improvisational politics, to be sure,
must be bounded by certain generic parameters, but it is not restricted to
administrative control or apriori regulation. One advantage of such an
open-ended conception of politics is that it helps smoke out certain
nondemocratic propensities in some professed democratic theories, whose
declarations of openness, inclusiveness, and neutrality stammer and sput-
ter whenconfronted with citizens who simply will not come to practice
politics in the right way, for the right ends, or with the right disposition
(e.g., citizens who are not impartial enough, rational enough, secular
enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so
on).
An improvisational politics can be called hermeneutical and it fits
weIl Nietzsche's advocacy of interpretation in philosophy (GS 374).
Rather than conceive politics as the application or administration of
ready-made rules or objective principles that simply inform the content
of particular situations with their proper sense and direction, a herme-
neutic approach to, say, legislative and judicial practice would construe
constitutional provisions as directed potentialities, as open-ended launch-
ings of possibilities calling for deliberation and judgment in particular
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cases. Hermeneutical politics runs counter to versions of "originalism,"
which holds that constitutional doctrines or passages have a fixed, dis-
cernible meaning or reflect some specific authorial intent. Proper politi-
cal practice would involve strict adherence to such meanings and inten-
tions, and a renunciation of an "activism" that bends, alters, or corrupts
original constructs. The problem with originalism is that it disdains the
possibility of historical change, misconstrues the linguistic and social
milieu of constitutional composition, and, in the case of the American
Constitution, is challenged by one of its own framers. 7 Central concepts
such as liberty can have multiple meanings and nuances, and can change
registers in changing circumstances. Moreover, as Derrida suggests, the
very nature of language, particularly in written texts, is unstable, inter-
textual, and countertextual, and so is not traceable to some essential
meaning or authorial intent that can ward off variations or transforma-
tions.8 Even if one could demonstrate the specific intent of a constitu-
tional author, the single-author fallacy ignores the fact that the American
Constitution was composed amidst the contentious, polyphonic collabora-
tion of many authors, with countless instances of compromise, sacrifice,
horse-trading, and modulation in the final product. Moreover, James
Madison, in Federalist 37, is almost postmodern in his recognition that
language, particularly political language, is intrinsically ambiguous,
vague, and imprecise. Accordingly, constitutional provisions cannot give
automatic direction for particular cases, but can only provide parameters
for deliberative judgments that are case-specific. Originalism, then, defies
and constrains the flexibility intrinsic to an experimental conception of
democracy.
The above discussion highlights the error of conceivingjudicial prac-
tice as essentially different from the more political spheres of electoral
and legislative practice. Even the Supreme Court can be called improvisa-
tional, albeit in a weak sense, since it too has to wrestle with interpreta-
tion of ambiguous constitutional language, and is itself not immune to
weighing political implications of its decisions or to its own political
machinations among justices.9 Constitutionallegal "standards" (e.g., re-
strictions on unreasonable search and seizure) are different from, say,
procedural "rules" that dictate specific types of action. Deliberation on
constitutional standards can elicit reasonable disagreements, hence the
common outcome of split decisions in Supreme Court cases. An improvi-
sational/hermeneutical model of politics would take split decisions as
inevitable outcomes ofjudicial deliberation, while foundationalist models
would be prone to call split decisions deficient, in the sense that some jus-
tices must not be reasoning in the right way.
Considering the American political system, one obvious way in which
democracy is improvisational is the amendability of the Constitution.
Hannah Arendt goes so far as to define the Constitution's authority in
terms of its "inherent capacity to be amended and augmented."10 Indeed,
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both Arendt and Derrida have approached American political documents
as performative rather than constative utterances, and therefore as
exhibiting a kind of abyssal, decisionist quality, despite historical appeals
to "self-evident truths."ll The possibility of a constitutional convention is
the ultimate provision for a strong sense of improvisation in American
democracy, which is one reason why such a prospect would rattle the
nerves of a foundationalist. Nonetheless, we can, with Claude Lefort,
describe an improvisational democracy as one that
invites us to replace the notion of a regime governed by laws, of a
legitimate power, by the notion of a regime founded upon the legitimacy
0/ a debate as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate-a debate
which is necessarily without any guarantor and without any end. 12
To conclude my discussion, improvisational politics not only is a
challenge to foundationalist theories, it also disrupts egalitarian senti-
ments that have continued to influence democratic theory. Assuming that
direct democracy is an impractical and even undesirable prospect in
many matters of government practice, much of the improvisational
performances described above require the contribution of select, compe-
tent players in executive, legislative, and judicial settings. Such instances
of unequal power and influence in politicalleadership, representative
government, and judicial expertise have often been taken to be undemo-
cratic and elitist, owing to their disproportionate status and effect com-
pared to the mass of citizens. But again, a Nietzschean-inspired, improvi-
sational model of democratic politics can affirm such select roles as
political solos within a structured, collective effort. Democracy as jazz is
not offended by stand-out performances. Political leadership, for in-
stance, can be construed as a kind of creative excellence that charts new
directions for the ensemble. One burden of leadership is making deci-
sions without anchored support, i.e., charting a course in the midst of
temporal, empirical, and cognitive limits, marked by uncertain, unpre-
dictable, complex, and conflicting elements. Deliberation in such a setting
(in, say, deciding whether to use force in a dangerous situation) calls for
a kind of improvisational finesse that can size up a situation and venture
an effective outcome-a function quite different from decisions in a
"political science" mode that presume to judge particular cases by some
universal standard. And continuing the jazz ensemble analogy, the
improvisations of leadership must involve a reciprocal relation with the
rest of the players in the group. Politicalleadership in a democracy is not
equivalent to dOßlination; there must be a symbiotic confluence of
leaders and followers that informs both sides of the relation. 13
In a wider sense, the political activity of citizens in a democracy has
been called a "stratified pluralism."14 Not all citizens are concerned with,
or interested in, politics. Stratified pluralism suggests that there is only a
certain segment of concerned, attentive citizens, and then an even smaller
NIETZSCHE, DEMOCRACY, AND EXCELLENCE 49
segment of activists and opinion leaders who tend to influence political
outcomes to an extent disproportionate to their numbers. Such a demo-
cratic elite, however, is not vested in any restricted sociallocation; it is
rather more a function of motivation, effort, and talent, and can cross the
entire spectrum of interests in the sociallandscape. Democratic political
practice, then, can be called elitist in a certain way, but with an openness
and flexibility that sustains a democratic base, especially if we keep in
mind the structure of improvisational group dynamics.
My aim in exploring the jazz metaphor has been to sketch some fea-
tures of democratic politics that are consonant with a Nietzschean resis-
tance to formalized constraint and substantive egalitarianism. Some may
consider this quite a stretch with respect to Nietzsche's thought. Suspi-
cion here is certainly warranted. I can only say that a significant part of
my argument comes from my perplexity about Nietzsche's political in-
tentions. It is not clear to me that Nietzsche ever had actual concrete
politics in mind when he railed against democracy. In any case, I argue
that if the issue is in fact concrete political practice, democracy can and
does exhibit a certain Nietzschean character.
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